This book is based on the papers given at a conference,
Ireland's Transition to Renewable
Energy, held at the Tipperary Institute in
Thurles over three days in Autumn 2002. The
event was organised by Feasta, the Dublin-based
Foundation for the Economics of
Sustainability, the Renewable Energy
Information Office of Sustainable Energy
Ireland and the Tipperary Institute itself. It drew
its inspiration from the work of Dr. Colin
Campbell, who has been arguing authoritatively
for some years that the world's oil supply
will begin to contract during the current decade
as a result of resource depletion.
Feasta has been interested in Dr. Campbell's
ideas since it was established in 1998 and he
spoke at the Money, Energy and Growth conference
it organised at Trinity College, Dublin,
in March 2000. The three themes indicated by
the title of the Trinity conference ran through
the Thurles one and will be apparent in this
book. This is because although the Thurles conference
was designed to be an impartial enquiry
into Ireland's energy future rather than the presentation
of a particular point of view, the questions
the enquiry was designed to answer were
naturally those that the organisers - and in particular,
Feasta, since it took the main responsibility
for assembling the programme - thought
were significant.
Feasta sees its task as to identify the characteristics
that the world will have to possess to
become economically, environmentally and
socially sustainable. Once it has done this, it
should be able to establish which features of the
present system need to be changed and how this
should be done. Feasta's work so far has led it
to believe that continual economic growth is
incompatible with sustainability and that a sustainable
world can only be powered by energy
from renewable sources. It has also identified
the present money-creation system as a barrier
to the achievement of sustainability. This is
because, since almost all the money now in use
was originally issued as a debt, unless people
borrow just a little more each year than than
they or others repaid during the previous one,
(the increase is required because the retained
earnings of the lenders have to be borrowed
back), the money supply will contract and this
will limit the amount of trading that is possible.
If this happened, the poor trading would discourage
further borrowing and could thus lead
to a depression setting in. The only way to
avoid this is by ensuring that economic growth
takes place every year, so that is what every
government on the planet seeks to do. The snag
is that generating the necessary growth almost
always involves higher levels of energy use.
Consequently, if fossil fuels are no longer available
in increasing quantities, unless nuclear
energy or renewable power sources can be
developed rapidly enough not just to make up
the increasing shortfall but also to provide extra
energy each year, the world economy could go
into a serious decline.
Accordingly, the Thurles conference opened
with Colin Campbell putting his case, a representative
of a major oil company responded by
saying that oil will be abundant for at least 25
years, and after some discussion, the meeting
went on to explore what other sources of energy
might become available and how well they
might be able to compensate for the missing oil
when it became necessary for them to do so. In
particular, the meeting asked, would other
power sources enable current rates of economic
growth to continue?
It became very clear during the event that the
depletion of oil and gas reserves would leave
few areas of human life unchanged and that, to
bring about a favourable outcome, it was crucial
to take the right decisions now. Perhaps the
most important decisions involve deciding how
the remaining fossil energy supplies should be
used. At any time, the size of the world's energy
supply is determined by the amount of energy
that has been invested as capital into developing
energy sources and by the amount of
energy these sources require as a regular input
to produce their energy output. So energy as
capital is the energy required to sink coalmines
and oil wells, to build nuclear power stations
and to erect wind turbines, while input energy is
the power required to use that capital equipment.
In the case of the coalmine, it is the energy
required to pump out water, to pump in air,
and to run the conveyor belts, the cutting equipment,
the cages that lift the coal to the surface,
the washery and the rest. And, of course, energy
is needed to transport the energy to the consumer,
whether this is via an electricity grid or
a road/rail/sea delivery system.
The point being made here is that energy both
as capital and as an input is needed to produce
an energy supply. Renewables and nuclear stations
usually require much more capital energy
during their set-up stages than do their fossil
equivalents but the latter generally consume
more income energy to produce a continuing
power supply. Moreover, as the most easily
exploited sources of oil, gas and coal are gradually
used up, the amount of input energy
required to continue to supply these fuels to the
market tends to rise. Eventually, the point will
be reached at which the amount of input energy
used for their production comes close to the
output energy that the fuels deliver usefully
when burned. At that point, it will be useless to
continue production because, although there
might be a lot of fuel left in the earth, it will no
longer be a net energy source. Unless improved
extraction technologies cut energy inputs, it
might as well not be there.
The portion of the fossil fuels still in the earth
that can be extracted and burned in a way that
delivers a net energy gain is an endowment that
can either be spent on meeting humanity's daily
running costs or invested for the future.
However, the current generation does not have
a completely free hand in deciding the split
between these two uses because over the centuries
since coal began to be mined, people
have developed ways of supporting themselves
that require a lot of energy to run. Until renewables
and/or nuclear sources have been developed
enough to supply that energy, a lot of fossil
fuel will have to be consumed to do so
instead. In other words, for some considerable
time, the world will only be able to turn a fraction
of each year's gas, coal and oil output into
capital energy to use to develop energy alternatives.
This means that, even leaving climate-change
considerations apart, the world's transition to
non-fossil sources of energy must not start too
late or proceed too slowly. If it does either, there
could be insufficient energy left to be spent as
capital on the construction of energy sources to
replace fossil fuels and the world could be
trapped for generations in a miserable lowenergy-
use economy that would lead to the premature
deaths of hundreds of millions of people.
The question of when a determined switch
away from fossil fuels should begin and how
quickly should it be carried out cannot be left to
the energy markets to decide because once oil
and gas prices start to rise as a result of increasing
scarcity, it will already be too late. Too late,
that is, to make the transition without denying
energy supplies to the weakest, most marginal
consumers in the world - in other words, to the
really poor - unless some sort of rationing is put
in place. This denial would not merely mean
that the poor had to use less kerosine for their
lights at night and for their cooking stoves. The
price of tractors, transport and fertilizers would
rise, pushing up the cost of food, which would
mean that, although undernourished already,
they would have to manage on even less.
On a world level, then, the availability of energy
is determined by the amount of fossil energy
left in the earth, the amount of energy it takes to
extract it, and by the amount of energy that has
been invested in developing fossil, nuclear and
renewable energy supplies. Until now, there has
been enough readily-extractable fossil energy
left for the supply of fuel to increase year after
year. As a result, the availability of money
rather than energy has been the constraint governing
the level of economic activity. However,
when the global production of fossil energy
begins to fall because sources which once supplied
fuel for little effort are becoming depleted
and considerably more energy has to be put in
to fossil sources to get any energy out, the
money supply will cease to determine how
much economic activity goes on around the
world. The energy supply will do so instead.
From that day on, increasing the amount of
money in circulation will have no effect at all
on overall energy supply. It will simply cause
an energy-price inflation. Indeed, energy will
replace money as the true measure of value and
conventional money will be valued according
to how much energy it can buy. This will be, of
course, a complete reversal of the present situation
in which energy is valued in money terms
rather than vice versa.
Because this fundamental change in the nature
of money is almost certain to happen within the
next 25 years, a lot of the discussion in this
book is in terms of how much energy it takes to
produce energy rather than the monetary cost of
producing it. A related reason for discussing
energy sources in this way is that money costs
and benefits have already shown themselves to
be false guides to energy policy and prospects.
For example, as David Morris describes in his
paper in this book, tax reliefs have enabled
alcohol produced from grain to provide 10 percent
of Minnesota's transportation fuel. A
praiseworthy step towards a sustainable energy
supply? Not at all. According to David Pimentel
of Cornell University, producing a U.S. gallon
of alcohol consumes 131,000 BTUs from fossil
sources in planting, growing and harvesting the
corn, then crushing, fermenting and distilling it.
That same gallon releases only 77,000 BTUs
when burned. "Put another way, about 70%
more energy is required to produce alcohol than
the alcohol actually contains" Pimentel says. If
energy was being counted rather than money,
this wasteful activity would stop overnight.
The American Petroleum Council also has also
fallen into the trap of counting money rather
than energy. It forecast in 1972 that when the
price of a barrel of oil exceeded $6, shale oil
extraction would be economic. Although the $6
price has been exceeded by a factor of two,
three or four for most of the period since, the
shale oil has stayed in the ground. The faulty
forecast arose because the APC thought that the
costs of extracting shale oil were unaffected by
current energy costs whereas the extraction
costs are essentially determined by the price of
oil to the industries that make the inputs and the
capital equipment that the shale oil processors
require. An energy-in/energy-out analysis
would have shown just how sensitive the
extraction process was to changes in energy
prices.
To avoid the discussion at the conference or in
this book falling into this trap we asked those
writing papers about particular energy sources
to say, if they possibly could, how many units
of energy the sources they were describing supplied
for each unit of energy put in. This
approach was so foreign to a major oil company
that it changed its mind about sending a
speaker. "Your suggestion to measure the energy
intensity of all activities necessary in the
provision of future sources of energy has certainly
fallen on fertile ground here" a senior figure
in the company wrote, asking to be sent
copies of the conference papers. "We will be
learning more from the results of the conference
then we are currently able to contribute."
A spokesperson for another major oil company
also found the approach novel and commented:
"I am somewhat confused by the theme of the
conference as you state it, that availability of
energy is not a function of price, but rather the
energy required to release or extract the energy.
That all costs of labour and capital can ultimately
be resolved to a cost of energy is true,
but the purpose of price is precisely to encapsulate
those costs." Up to a point, Lord Copper,
but, as in the Minnesotan case, those prices can
go wrong. Consequently, as energy is about to
replace money as the real measure of value anyway,
we decided that we had better start costing
it in its own terms.
The book opens with the text of Dr. Campbell's
conference talk. We are, however, unable to
present the full counterview advanced by David
Frowd, who was at the time the head of the
energy group in Shell International's scenarios
team. He has since retired. In his talk, Frowd
flashed several slides packed with figures on
the screen much more quickly than anyone in
the audience could note anything down. He
then left the conference before anyone could
ask him privately for the full details. He subsequently
refused to make the slides or the data on
which he based his conclusions available and
the transcript we had made of his talk was
meaningless without these figures. "We don't
want a debate," he said. It is hard to see his
presence at the conference as anything more
than a spoiling exercise designed to prevent
firm conclusions about when oil and gas output
might begin to decline from emerging. After all,
once Shell's customers recognise that scarcity
is going to make their oil deliveries much more
costly in a few years' time, they will start
switching to other energy sources, damaging
the company's market now. Is that why a debate
isn't wanted?
While we have done our best to present
Frowd's arguments fully and fairly, we have
also printed the opinions of the second in command
of the world's largest oil company,
Exxon-Mobil, Harry Longwell, who though he
agrees with Dr. Campbell's views on the
decline in the rate at which oil is being found
(he uses one of Campbell's graphs in his article)
nevertheless expresses confidence that the oil
industry Œhas the resources to meet future global
energy demand for some considerable time.'
Other oilmen have been even more forthcoming.
In February, 1999, for example, Mike
Bowlin, the chairman and CEO of a major
California-based oil company, ARCO, better
known by its old name, Atlantic Richfield, said
that the world was entering 'the last days of the
Age of Oil'. His company was therefore looking
to a future in which motor fuels from renewable
sources played a bigger part. ARCO has since
been taken over by BP.
This introduction has been written to be as
neutral as possible. The conclusions that I, personally,
draw from the material in this book
come at the end. It should be said that Feasta,
the Tipperary Institute and Sustainable Energy
Ireland do not necessarily stand over all the
opinions expressed in these pages. Nor do I.
The conference was designed to be a wideranging
enquiry and that is exactly what it was.
This book is more wide-ranging still as we have
taken the opportunity to print five or six items
which cast an interesting light on, or supplement,
the conference papers themselves. The
advantages of a methanol economy over a
hydrogen one, the prospects for oil from tar
sands, and the sequestration of carbon dioxide
are examples of the topics covered by these
additional papers. So is the panel on Ireland's
growing dependency on oil on the opposite
page.
The major disappointment of the conference
was that, although the speakers were all leaders
in their fields and the attendance was good,
very few of those responsible for making decisions
involving energy issues bothered to come.
Feasta and its partners hope that this book will
enable them to pick up on the ideas they
missed. Ireland's future will be largely determined
by whether or not they do.
This is one of almost 50
chapters and articles in the 336-page large format book, Before the Wells
Run Dry. Copies of the book are available for £9.95 from Green Books.TRAPPED IN MISERY
FAULTY FORECAST
LAST DAYS OF OIL